In their group life they are congenial and happy-go-lucky. This is obvious not only during rest periods but also while they work. Side play is frequent and good-natured bantering constantly flashes back and forth. During rest periods everyone either plays cards or stands by as an interested spectator, and in these games rivalry is always keen but congenial. Several of the newer men express the consensus of opinion by describing their associates as “a swell bunch of guys.”5
The need for a more systematic inquiry resulted in the selection of 14 male operators who were to work under standard shop conditions. These workers were observed and interviewed over a period of six and a half months; the study was terminated when work ceased because of the depression. This group of men were reluctantly assigned to a separate room. By this time the researchers knew that such a change is often of importance; however, it made possible better control of the study. The observer was stationed in the room; he was to assume the role of a disinterested spectator but was not to set himself off from the group. He adhered strictly to the following rules: (1) Give no orders and in no way demonstrate authority. (2) Do not take part in arguments. (3) Do not enter into conversation or seem overanxious to hear about what is going on. (4) Never violate confidences of employees.
The observer was asked to note the formal organization of supervisor and employees, and also all informal groupings of the men. Further, he was to observe the interrelations of these two types of organizations. The interviewer did not enter the test room. His function was to gain insight into the workers’ attitudes, thoughts, and feelings, whereas the observer was to describe the actual verbal and overt behavior of the group. Working thus together, these two were to gather data from this group concerning the department, the company, and community.
The workers in the Bank Wiring Observation Room study consisted of three groups: nine wiremen, three soldermen, and two inspectors. Each did a specific task but necessarily collaborated with the others. This department was chosen because it met such criteria as (1) the samenge of the task; (2) exactly determinable output; (3) shortness of task (one minute required); (4) work pace determined by operator; (5) assurance of continued work; (6) the ease of removing the group as a unit from the department; (7) the experience of the operators. These criteria were similar to those used in the Relay Assembly study, but from this point on there was a difference.
The men were invited to cooperate in the study. The first week they worked or appeared to be working all the time. They were cautious toward the observer. When they complained to him bout poor lighting, he told them that he had no authority and suggested that they refer all complaints to their supervisor. It was three weeks before the men started to relax and behave more as they did in their regular department. It was learned that these men did not think that either the group chief or the section chief had much authority. The foreman spent little time in the room so they were relatively free from authority.
The system of payment was a complicated wage incentive plan that had been instituted to promote efficiency by encouraging production; it was also believed to be a fair means of apportioning employee income. It was soon found that this wage plan was not working. The workers defined a day’s work as the complete wiring of two units and either they stopped before quitting time or they paced themselves to last out the day. No uniform explanation or reason was forthcoming for this definition of a day’s work by the men, but it completely invalidated the incentive plan, as the following conversations prove:
Worker (2) : (After claiming that he turned out more work than anyone else in the group.) They (his co-workers) don’t like to have met turn in so much, but I turn it in anyway.
(In another interview.) Right now I’m turning out over 7000 a day, around 7040. The rest of the fellows kick because I do that. They want me to come down. They want me to come down to around 6600, but I don’t see why I should. If I did, the supervisors would come in and ask me what causes me to drop like that. I’ve been turning out about that much for the last six months now and I see no reason why I should turn out less. There’s no reason why I should turn out more either.
Worker (3) : No one can turn out the bogey consistently. Well, occasionally some of them do.
Now since the layoff started there’s been a few fellows down there who have been turning out around 7300 a day. They’ve been working like hell. I think it is foolishness to do it because I don’t think it will do them any good, and it is likely to do the rest of us a lost of harm.
Interviewer : Just how do you figure that?
Worker 3 : Well, you see if they start turning out around 7300 a day over a period of weeks and if three of them do it, then they can lay one of the men off, because three men working at that speed can do as much as four men working at the present rate.
Interviewer: And you think that is likely to happen?
Worker 3 : Yes, I think it would. At present we are only scheduled for 40 sets ahead. In normal times we were scheduled for over 100. If they find that fewer men can do the work, they’re going to lay off more of us. When things pick up they will expect us to do as much as we are now. That means they will raise the bogey on us. You see how it works?
Interviewer: You say there is no incentive to turn out more work. If all of you did more work, wouldn’t you make more money?
