Industrial Psychology - Unit 1.10

Worker 4 : No, we wouldn’t They told us that down there one time. You know, the supervisors came around and told us that very thing, that if we would turn out more work we would make more money, but we can’t see it that way. Probably what would happen is that our bogey would be raised, and then we would just be turning out more work for the same money. I can’t see that.
Worker 5 : There’s another thing, you know the fellows give the fast workers the raspberry all the time. Work hard, try to do your best, and they don’t appreciate it at all. They don’t seem to figure that they are gaining any by it. It’s not only the wiremen, the soldermen don’t like it either. The fellows who loaf along are liked better than anybody else. Some of them take pride in turning out as little work as they can and making the boss think they’re turning out a whole lot. They think it’s smart. I think a lot of them have the idea that if you work fast  the rate will be cut. That would mean that they would have to work faster for the same money. I’ve never seen our rate cut yet, so I don’t know whether it would happen or not. I have heard it has happened in some cases though.
Worker 6 :  (Talking about a relative of his who worked in the plant.) She gets in here early and goes ahead and makes up a lot of parts so that when the rest of the girls start in the she’s already got a whole lot stacked up. In that way she turns out a great deal of work. She’s money greedy. That’s what’s the matter with her and they shouldn’t allow that. All she does is spoil the rate for the rest of the girls.
Interviewer: How does she do that?
Worker 6 : By turning out so much. When they see her making so much money, they cut the rate.
Worker 7 : There’s one little guy down there that turns out over 7000 a day. I think there’s a couple of them. And we have to put up with it?
The men devised various means of controlling production. Name calling and minor physical punishment were two of the more common ways of restricting output. Workers who produced too much were nicknamed “Slave,” “Speed King,” or “Phar Lap” (a champion race horse of that year). They were also “binged”. A “bing” is a very hard blow on the muscles of the upper arm. The one who is hit never protests but is allowed to “bing” back.
The men’s concept of their average daily production was reflected in rather constant weekly production figures. The men achieved this constancy by reporting more day-work allowances than they were entitled to. In addition they sometimes reported more - or in some case less - production than they had actually turned out. The primary reason for this was to gain group acceptance.
Three men always reported more work than they actually produced and two reported less; the other varied their reports. A comparison of morning and afternoon production showed that the faster men slowed down in the afternoon, whereas the slower men worked at a more even pace. Briefly, the findings were that the men were restricting production in accordance with their definition of a working day, thus nullifying the validity of the wage incentive plan. Interpersonal relations apparently were more important than the wage incentive.
The group chief had certain difficulties. In the first place he had to handle the day-work claims of the men. These claims were made to justify being paid at an hourly rate rather than on a production basis. Company rules allowed such claims, and they could be made for any number of reasons. The group chief had either to accept these claims as justifiable or be arbitrary in rejecting them. He chose to accept them and thereby gained the good will of his men. It would have been difficult to prove any of the reasons given as being incorrect or unwarranted.
Another problem was job trading. The only excuse for this was physical incapacity, as when a solderman developed a sore finger. Determining how sore a “sore” finger has to be made this a difficult claim to dispute. Thus the group chief was sympathetic to his men and steered a middle course, and he, in turn, was popular with them. During this study he was demoted because of business conditions and a group chief with greater seniority took over. The new one placed great stress on conduct and efficiency. The men thought that he was exercising more authority than was vested in him, and they did not admit his authority merely because he exercised it. Certainly the first group chief with his leniency received more cooperation than the second one.
The next representative of management was the section chef, and since he supervised a number of groups he was never in close contact with any one group at all times. His function was more managerial, and he was considered to be more “in the know” than the group chief. Even though the men argued freely with him, they regarded him as having more authority than the group chief. The assistant foreman, next in the management hierarchy, was listened to with respect, but the men never argued with him. If they disliked what he said, they waited until he left to voice their opinions. The relations of the assistant foreman to the group were pleasant. The foreman was called the “old man”. When he came in, conversation stopped and no one knowingly broke any of the rules. The men showed apprehension while he was present.
Considering the management-employee situation, it was apparent that although communication traveled down in the form of orders, the two first line supervisors were likely to be questioned. But there was a gap in communications on the way up from employee to foreman. Consequently the foreman and top management were unaware of the reasons for the failure incentive. The fact that the men reacted differently from the way it had been assumed they would made the incentive plan ineffectual and was something the supervisory organization could not remedy.
The relations among the employees were especially interesting. The men worked according to “their standard” of production, but in addition they talked, argued, played games, matched coins or indulged in other forms of gambling, formed cliques, took sides, traded jobs, shared candy, insulted one another by belittling nationality and religion, and helped one another in their work. They nicknamed each other “Runt”, “Shrimp”, “Jumbo”, and “Goofy”. Their conversation ranged from work to women to horse racing. In short, they did many things together, in addition to working.
The connector wireman, even though their rates might be the same as the selector wireman paid, represented the “elite”. Going on connectors was a step forward, whereas being put on selectors was regarded as a demotion. The wireman occupied a social position above the soldermen. Job trading between them  originated most often with a request from the wiremen. The soldermen wore goggles which they resented, and the wiremen demonstrated their superiority by expressing distransported materials. He was the butt of much horseplay.
The inspectors belonged to a different group. They were responsible to a different set of supervisors. They were not an integral part of the group and were considered outsiders.
A subtle manifestation of status appeared in the way the men dressed.  The section group chiefs wore vests but no coats. The men wore neither coats nor vests. When the men reported for interviews they did not put on their coats, but the inspectors put on both coats and vests.
During lulls in activity the men played games. It was interesting to note that two group always formed. Group I consisted of four wiremen, a solderman, and an inspector. This group usually gambled. Group II, not as completely set, consisted primarily of one solderman and three or four wiremen. They preferred “binging”. A solderman, a wireman, and the other inspector were isolates, that is, not in either group. These groups or cliques carried over from games to job trading, quarrels over opening and closing windows and friendships and antagonisms. Furthermore, Group I regarded itself as the superior or “front-room” clique. They felt that their talks were on a higher plane, they ate chocolates rather than “junk”, and thy were less boisterous.
A diagrammatic summary of the internal organization is shown in figure. There were four main determinants of clique membership: (1) you should not turn out too much work (rate busting); (2) you should not turn out too little work (chiseler); (3) you should not tell a supervisor anything that would harm an associated (squealer); (4) you should not act officiously (this applied to inspectors and group chiefs as well as workers).
This intricate social organization served to protect the group both inside and outside. Control inside was obtained through ridicule, sarcasm, and “binging”.  Protection outside was afforded by excessive day work claims and constancy of production. It has already been noted that management knew nothing about the group and its attitudes toward production and management rules until this phase of the study uncovered it. All companies, large and small, have such a setup and under usual conditions they have no way of knowing about it.
Study 5 Personnel Counseling
The personnel counseling study was not begun until four year later, because of the depression. However, these four years allowed for an appraisal of the vast significance of this series of unique studies in industry. The experiments on illumination showed that there was nothing resembling a close relationship between a change in physical environment and production. The relay Assembly Test Room with its continuous rise in production, regardless of the changes, showed the importance of employee attitude toward job, supervisor, and home. The Mass Interviewing Program not only brought about improved methods of interviewing but also uncovered much data on specific attitudes, as when it showed that similar situations and conditions could be sources of satisfaction to some and dissatisfaction to others. The suggestion of a group formed by the workers led to the Bank Wiring Observation Room study, with its findings on the intricacies of informal organization and the ways in which this affects production and supervisory relations. It also showed the breakdown in the flow of communication from employee to management was free to give orders but completely in the dark as to how they were finally received.
Since all four studies indicate both a lack of accomplishment in really promoting employee relations and the importance of this work, the fifth study may be regarded as the culmination of the experimenters efforts to bring this important area into focus. There were two objectives. The first was to have a non authoritative and impartial agency interview employees to diagnose their problems and work with supervisors on their methods of supervision. The second was to improve the method of communication within the company, in view of the ample evidence indicating that it was lacking in certain situations when the social organization conflicted with the managerial organization. The plan was put into operation with the announcement that “personnel men” would be assigned to the departments and would be around to talk to the employees. The program which was generally accepted, led  to improvement in three fields: personal adjustments, supervisor-employee relations and employee management relations. In several cases there were obvious improvements in personal adjustments. Employees showed changes in personality, and freedom from anxiety and other forms of behavior that might be diagnosed as psychoneurotic. The personnel counselors were helpful in making the supervisors see their problems with less emotion and more understanding. Finally, the reports helped management to a better understanding of employee behavior and sentiment so that policies could be formulated that would result in less friction between management and workers.


                                                                                                                                   
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