Period 12 returned to the full 48-hour week without rests. The girls were informed that this period would last about three months and were asked to work in their normal fashion. Although the average hourly output dropped, total production reached the highest peak of any period. However, the girls took their own rest pauses during this period. They would eat candy and get thirsty, so they went to the drinking fountains; in addition, there was much laughing and boisterous joking. The girls still liked the test room better because they could scream and have fun and because they had no bosses. Operator 3 at this stage told the test-room observer to “shut up.”
In period 13 the rest periods were resumed. The girls furnished their own lunch but the company furnished the tea. During this period it was observed that instead of antagonistic competition the girls worked toward a common goal. If one girl slowed up because she felt ill, the others would speed up. The total weekly output rose.
Since a careful record of “personal time” taken by employees was kept throughout the experiment, there is clear-cut evidence to show that organized rest periods decreased this personal time but also decreased the workweek. For example, in periods 3 and 12 (no rest periods) personal time averaged fourteen minutes. In periods 7, 10 and 13 with twenty-five minutes of rest periods it average seven minutes. In other words, the working day was shortened by eighteen minutes instead of twenty-five minutes. Physical examinations showed that the health of the employees was not impaired during this study. Absenteeism for these six operators while working in the factory averaged 15.2 irregularities but dropped to 3.5 irregularities in the test room. This is most probably to be attributed to a change in employee attitude.
The girls liked the workweek with no Saturdays best of all. (Next they preferred the 4:30 P.M. stop with rest and lunch. The experimenters report that it is doubtful if the girls would have been unanimous in their approval had they not been paid for Saturday morning off. The present writers do not understand the doubt on the part of the experimenters!
During the course of this experiment the girls’ attitude toward those in charge of it change continually. In the early stages there was apprehension and fear. This finally disappeared as a result of the fact that the girls were consulted and informed about the various stages. By period 13 they liked the test room and its pleasanter, freer, and happier working conditions. In other words, they preferred the lack of restraint and excessive supervision. The test-room observer was regarded as a friendly representative of management and not as a supervisor who “bawls us out.” Another change that took place was the solidifying of the group. Four of the girls started going out with each other and all of them helped the others with their work. They no longer worked as individuals.
The experimenters were perplexed by the general trend toward increased production independent of rest pauses and shorter hours and by the improved mental attitude of the girls. Five tentative explanations were suggested to explain these facts:
(1) Improved material conditions and methods of work
(2) Shorter hours, which provided a relief from cumulative fatigue
(3) Wage incentive plan
(4) Changes in method of supervision
The first explanation was dismissed. T.N. Whitehead (1933), who analyzed the entire body of data, finds no conclusive evidence to support it. There were no significant correlations between physical conditions and production. The second and third explanations were dismissed after careful examination of the daily work curves of the operators. There was no evidence that these curves resembled fatigue curves, and only one operator’s work curves showed a resemblance to the monotony curve.
In order to establish the truth or falsity of the wage incentive as an explanation, two minor studies were made. These were known as the Second Relay Assembly Test Room and the Mica Splitting Test Room. The original Relay Assembly Test group had a change of environment as well as of payment, whereas the Second Relay Assembly group had only a change of payment. Five experienced operators were put on a payment basis similar to that of the original group but were kept in the factory. This group increased production almost immediately by 12 percent and they continued at this level; but when they went back to the original method of payment there was a drop. These facts were interpreted by the experimenters to mean that (1) the formation of a small group to determine piecework earnings was an important factor in the Relay Assembly group and (2) subsequent rises in test-room production could not be explained in terms of this factor alone. A very important point is that the moral of the entire department was shattered. The other operators wanted similar consideration (and possibly the chance to earn more money). Because of the friction in the department, this experiment had to be discontinued.
In the Mica Splitting Test Room experiment the basis of wage payment remained at the same individual piece rate, but changes in working conditions similar to those in the test room were made. The primary purpose was to study the effects of the change in payment in the test room. Five operators took part in the experiment two were selected at random and they chose the other three. Their production rose an average of 15 percent in 14 months. ;In the Second Relay group production rose 12 percent and the Relay Test Assembly Room rise in output averaged 30 percent. It can be assumed that 1.5 percent is the maximum that can be attributed to a change in financial incentive; the remainder must be attribute to other factors.
The experiments presented two conclusions based upon the evidence:
(1) There was absolutely no evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the continuous increase in output in the Relay Assembly Test Room during the first two years could be attributed to the wage incentive factor alone
